

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

AXIS SPINE NV, LLC,

Case No.: 2:17-cv-02147-APG-VCF

Plaintiff

V.

XTANT MEDICAL HOLDINGS, INC.,

[ECF Nos. 40, 47]

Defendant

Plaintiff Axis Spine NV, LLC sues defendant Xtant Medical Holdings, Inc. for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.

10 According to Axis, the parties entered into a contract for Axis to sell Xtant's products on
11 consignment for commissions, for Xtant to buy Axis's inventory, and for Axis to obtain stock
12 options as part of the deal. Axis alleges Xtant breached the agreement by failing to pay all
13 agreed amounts. Alternatively, Axis alleges that if the contract was never executed, then Xtant
14 has been unjustly enriched.

15 Xtant previously moved to dismiss, which I granted with leave for Axis to amend. ECF
16 No. 37. After Axis filed its amended complaint (ECF No. 38), Xtant again moved to dismiss and
17 later moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 40, 47. Axis opposes both motions.

18 I deny Xtant's motion to dismiss as moot because the issues can be resolved on a more
19 fulsome record at summary judgment. I grant Xtant's motion for summary judgment on the
20 contractual claims because no genuine dispute remains that the parties never had a meeting of the
21 minds on all material terms under the letter of intent. I deny Xtant's motion on the unjust
22 enrichment claim because a reasonable jury could find the parties acted as if they had entered
23 into separate contracts for regular commissions, performance incentives, and an asset purchase.

1 **I. ANALYSIS**

2 Axis distributed medical devices for Xtant under a resale arrangement where Axis would
3 buy Xtant's products and resell them to hospitals and physicians. ECF Nos. 48-2 at 9-10; 53-3 at
4 3; 53-4 at 1-2, 5. In late 2015, Xtant representatives contacted Axis about changing the
5 relationship between the two companies and moving Axis to a consignment business model. ECF
6 Nos. 53-2 at 19; 53-4 at 3. Xtant wanted to change the dynamic so it could realize on its own
7 financial statements all of the revenue Axis was earning, even if the profit for Xtant would
8 remain the same. ECF Nos. 48-2 at 28-29; 53-3 at 3; 53-4 at 3-4, 5-6. Xtant's management
9 deemed it more important to show investors increased revenue rather than increased profits. ECF
10 No. 53-4 at 5-6.

11 In early 2016, the parties began exchanging drafts of a letter of intent (LOI) to bring
12 about this new arrangement. ECF Nos. 48-3, 53-5. In March 2016, Axis began selling a few
13 items on consignment and began doing so consistently starting April 1, 2016, even though the
14 parties had not yet executed a contract. ECF No. 53-2 at 19.

15 On April 9, 2016, Xtant's chief executive officer, Daniel Goldberger, sent a draft of the
16 LOI to Axis and requested confirmation of its terms so he could submit it to Xtant's board of
17 directors for approval. ECF No. 48-9. The LOI, which was marked as "non binding, for
18 discussion only," proposed a three-year term and provided that Xtant would pay Axis \$250,000
19 at signing and \$75,000 at each of the first and second anniversaries of signing. *Id.* It also
20 provided for stock options but did not identify a strike price.¹ *Id.* The draft LOI set forth a
21

22 ¹ A stock option is "the right to purchase a share of stock from a company at a fixed price,
23 referred to as the 'strike price,' on or after a specified vesting date." *United States v. Reyes*, 577
F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009). "In general, companies grant options with a strike price equal
to the market price on the date the options are granted." *Id.*

1 commission schedule of 50% of all revenue, with increasing commission percentages up to 75%
2 if certain revenue objectives were met. *Id.* Finally, Axis would provide a list of inventory valued
3 at approximately \$850,000 that Axis would turn over to Xtant. *Id.* Axis confirmed its agreement
4 to the terms that same day. ECF No. 53-14 at 1.

5 Xtant's board approved the LOI's general structure and authorized Goldberger to work
6 with the legal and accounting departments to complete the deal. ECF No. 53-3 at 22-23. The
7 board conditioned final approval on Xtant conducting due diligence, including performing an
8 inventory of the assets to be purchased and ensuring that Axis was not a surgeon-owned
9 business. ECF Nos. 48-5 at 18; 53-2 at 14-17.

10 In the meantime, Goldberger came up with an interim plan that called for the parties to
11 enter into three separate agreements until the LOI could be finalized. ECF Nos. 48-4 at 16; 53-3
12 at 12-13. Those three agreements would be for base commissions at a rate of 50%, an incentive
13 contract for another 25% in commissions if revenues exceeded a certain amount, and an asset
14 purchase agreement. ECF No. 53-3 at 12-13.

15 In May 2016, Axis and Xtant executed a temporary usage agreement (TUA) that
16 provided for Xtant to pay Axis a 50% commission rate. ECF No. 53-8. Goldberger testified that
17 Xtant entered this agreement so it could immediately start realizing Axis's revenues on its own
18 financial statements. ECF No. 56-1 at 7.

19 Although the other two agreements were not signed, the parties acted in many ways as if
20 they had been. ECF No. 48-2 at 16. For example, Xtant paid the extra 25% in commissions.
21 ECF Nos. 48-2 at 20, 59, 65; 53-3 at 14, 28; 53-10; 53-13; 53-14; 53-16. The parties also acted
22 in some ways as if Xtant had already purchased Axis's inventory and Xtant made an initial
23 \$125,000 payment. ECF Nos. 53-2 at 2-3, 7; 53-3 at 28; 53-7; 53-9. However, the performance

1 incentive and asset purchase agreements were never signed. ECF No. 48-2 at 66. The parties
2 continued to make changes to the LOI through October 2016, but it too was never signed. ECF
3 Nos. 48-2 at 15; 48-11 at 4; 53-15.

4 In March 2017, Xtant’s new chief executive officer, Carl O’Connell, told Axis that Xtant
5 intended to honor the deal but was still working on drafting a final agreement. ECF No. 53-12.
6 O’Connell authorized Xtant to make a \$50,000 payment to Axis as a show of good faith. *Id.*
7 However, in June 2017, Xtant’s restructuring officer, David Barker, told Axis that Xtant would
8 not agree to the LOI, would not issue the stock options, and would not pay the commission rates
9 set forth in the LOI. ECF No. 53-2 at 12-13. In August 2017, Xtant terminated the TUA. ECF
10 No. 48-19.

11 Axis asserts claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
12 dealing, and unjust enrichment. Xtant moves for summary judgment.

13 **II. ANALYSIS**

14 Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute as to
15 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
16 56(a), (c). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
17 *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence
18 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” *Id.*

19 The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of
20 the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence
21 of a genuine issue of material fact. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The
22 burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a
23 genuine issue of material fact for trial. *Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson*, 212 F.3d 528, 531

1 (9th Cir. 2000); *Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc.*, 911 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018) (“To defeat
2 summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce evidence of a genuine dispute of material
3 fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.”). I view the evidence and reasonable inferences in the
4 light most favorable to the non-moving party. *James River Ins. Co. v. Hebert Schenk, P.C.*, 523
5 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2008).

6 **A. Contract-Based Claims**

7 Xtant argues that the contract-based claims fail because no contract was formed through
8 the LOI where the parties did not execute the contract, continued to negotiate, and never reached
9 a meeting of the minds on material terms. Xtant also contends the LOI is unenforceable under
10 the statute of frauds because Xtant never signed it and no exception to the statute applies.
11 Finally, Xtant argues that even if there is a contract, Axis breached it first, thereby excusing
12 Xtant’s performance.

13 Axis responds that the parties finalized the LOI in April 2016 and began acting according
14 to its terms. Axis also argues that it has shown an exception to the statute of frauds by part
15 performance combined with Xtant’s promises to reduce the agreement to a finalized contract.
16 Axis asserts the LOI’s terms are sufficiently definite and the parties performed according to
17 those terms. Axis denies that it breached first and contends Xtant’s own unclean hands bar it
18 from denying the contract’s enforceability.

19 Axis’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
20 dealing require the existence of an enforceable contract. *See Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc.*,
21 735 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying Nevada breach of contract law); *JPMorgan Chase*
22 *Bank, N.A. v. KB Home*, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023 (D. Nev. 2009) (same for breach of
23 covenant of good faith and fair dealing). “Basic contract principles require, for an enforceable

1 contract, an offer and acceptance, meeting of the minds, and consideration.” *May v. Anderson*,
2 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Nev. 2005). “[P]reliminary negotiations do not constitute a binding
3 contract unless the parties have agreed to all material terms.” *Id.* “A valid contract cannot exist
4 when material terms are lacking or are insufficiently certain and definite.” *Id.* “A contract can be
5 formed, however, when the parties have agreed to the material terms, even though the contract’s
6 exact language is not finalized until later.” *Id.* Price and payment are material terms. *Matter of*
7 *Estate of Kern*, 823 P.2d 275, 277 (Nev. 1991). Whether a contract was formed is a fact
8 question. *Certified Fire Prot. Inc. v. Precision Constr.*, 283 P.3d 250, 255 (Nev. 2012).

9 Although contract formation generally is a question of fact, there can be no genuine
10 dispute in this case that the LOI is not a binding contract because the parties never agreed to a
11 material term. The LOI provides that Xtant was to grant stock options, but key aspects of those
12 options were never defined. As Axis’s owner admitted at his deposition, the parties never agreed
13 on the type of shares Axis would receive, the grant date, the vesting date, or the strike price. ECF
14 No. 48-2 at 14, 22-23, 30-31. I therefore grant Xtant’s motion for summary judgment on these
15 claims.

16 **B. Unjust Enrichment**

17 Xtant argues this claim fails because the TUA is an express contract covering the parties’
18 relationship, and an unjust enrichment claim is not available if a contract exists. Xtant also
19 argues that even if unjust enrichment could apply, there is no inequity because Axis received
20 over \$3 million in commissions and the commission rate was higher than what Xtant paid other
21 distributors. Axis responds that if there is no enforceable contract, then it is entitled to resort to
22 equity because it detrimentally relied on Xtant’s part performance and numerous representations
23

1 that it would honor the LOI's terms. Axis contends that simply because it was paid a lot of
2 money does not mean it was equitably compensated.

3 Under Nevada law, unjust enrichment “exists when the plaintiff confers a benefit on the
4 defendant, the defendant appreciates such benefit, and there is acceptance and retention by the
5 defendant of such benefit under circumstances such that it would be inequitable for him to retain
6 the benefit without payment of the value thereof.” *Certified Fire Prot. Inc.*, 283 P.3d at 257
7 (quotation omitted). A benefit in this context “can include services beneficial to or at the request
8 of the other, denotes any form of advantage, and is not confined to retention of money or
9 property.” *Id.* (quotation omitted). A claim for unjust enrichment “is not available when there is
10 an express, written contract, because no agreement can be implied when there is an express
11 agreement.” *Leasepartners Corp. v. Robert L. Brooks Tr. Dated Nov. 12, 1975*, 942 P.2d 182,
12 187 (Nev. 1997).

13 Genuine disputes remain on this claim. Although the TUA is an express contract, a
14 reasonable jury could find that it covered only base commissions and the parties contemplated
15 two other contracts that were never formally executed. The TUA does not contain a clause
16 stating that it is the entire agreement between the parties. ECF No. 48-21. Goldberger testified
17 that the parties intended to have three agreements, that he agreed with Axis's characterization of
18 the parties' understanding that Axis was entitled to another 25% in commissions if it hit revenue
19 goals, and that Axis was entitled to payment for inventory. There is evidence that Xtant
20 performed consistent with these understandings, including paying the 25% commission and
21 paying an initial \$125,000 for inventory. A reasonable jury could conclude Xtant did not do this
22 out of the goodness of its heart but because the TUA did not cover these subjects.

23

1 Additionally, a reasonable jury could find Axis conferred a benefit on Xtant and it would
2 be unjust for Xtant to retain it without paying for the value of that benefit. Goldberger testified
3 that Xtant “received the benefit of the bargain” and got “the economic benefits.” ECF No. 48-4.
4 The fact that Xtant paid Axis over \$3 million does not end the matter because a reasonable jury
5 could find the value of the benefits conferred was greater than what Xtant paid and that it would
6 be unjust for Xtant to retain those benefits without paying Axis more. The course of the parties’
7 negotiations and evidence of Axis’s profit margin prior to converting to the consignment model
8 could lead a jury to conclude the value of the benefits conferred exceeded \$3 million.

9 **C. Rule 56(d)**

10 Axis requests relief under Rule 56(d). I deny that request because Axis has not
11 established by affidavit “the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery,” that “the
12 facts sought exist,” or that those facts “are essential to oppose summary judgment.” *Family*
13 *Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp.*, 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008).

14 **III. CONCLUSION**

15 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Xtant Medical Holdings, Inc.’s motion to
16 dismiss (**ECF No. 40**) is **DENIED as moot**.

17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Xtant Medical Holdings, Inc.’s motion for
18 summary judgment (**ECF No. 47**) is **GRANTED in part**. Defendant Xtant Medical Holdings,
19 Inc. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff Axis Spine NV, LLC’s claims for
20 breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The motion is
21 denied as to plaintiff Axis Spine NV, LLC’s unjust enrichment claim.

22 DATED this 6th day of March, 2019.


23

ANDREW P. GORDON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE